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Abstract
The “smart city” has emerged as the latest urban buzzword in discussions of the elementary 
functions of the modern city. Attracting corporate power, money and private tech compa-
nies (e.g., Cisco, Google, IBM, Tesla), the smart city has become a popular brand because 
it is presented primarily as an evidence-based, objective and value-neutral concept. In this 
article, we will question precisely this “non-ideology” ideology of the smart city and argue 
that the phenomenon of the smart city demands a critical criminological response, as much 
as a philosophical and sociological one. First, we argue that instruments which were clas-
sified traditionally as tools of surveillance and control are now rebranded as essential com-
ponents of the smart city package in order to increase the cleanliness and order of the city. 
Second, we consider how the smart city oscillates within a social imaginary populated by 
feelings of fear and fantasy. We conclude by suggesting that the smart city not only repro-
duces the social order, but also produces new social categories out of new forms of smart 
governance of crime and disorder.
Introduction
The “smart city” has become one of the most fascinating new concepts in relation to the 
governance of public space. An urban buzzword and a great marketing tool, the smart city 
label attracts corporate power, money and private tech companies (e.g., Cisco, Google, 
IBM, Tesla). While the concept dates back to the 1990s, few really know exactly what a 
smart city is (Albino et al. 2015), and as geographer Hollands (2008) has argued, it is the 
label, itself, that has created this confusion. “Smartness” seems to refer to a wide range of 
meanings—creative, digital, intelligent, interconnected, virtual—and the phenomenon of 
smart city is associated with different interpretations, projects and visions (Vanolo 2016), 
thereby precluding a universally acknowledged definition (Cocchia 2014).
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Although the concept itself is far from being unambiguous, so-called smart city projects 
have become increasingly popular and have proliferated all over the world. For policymak-
ers and urban planners, the smart city is viewed as an urban utopia—one that promises to 
rationalize the planning and management of cities and to offer a means to solve unprec-
edented urban challenges, including the creation of risk-free and safe cities (Datta 2015; 
Ersoy 2017; Townsend 2013). According to the European Parliament, 240 European cities 
with populations over 100,000 have some smart city features relating to the daily liveli-
hood of residents, environmental protection, city services, public security and other fields.1 
As we will argue in this article, we have to be particularly cautious of notions that sound 
beautiful or smart because they can be the ones that best mask problems and can be the 
hardest ones to challenge. While the smart city has become a popular brand for several 
reasons, a main rationale has been its framing as an evidence-based, objective and value-
neutral concept that is pragmatic above everything else (Kitchin and Dodge 2011; Sad-
owski and Pasquale 2015).
With all the optimistic promises and hopeful visions surrounding the discourse on 
smart cities, it can be easy to lose track of the politics that are embedded and coded into 
these interconnected and technological initiatives. As Sadowski and Pasquale (2015) have 
argued, if we conceptualize these urban transformations as merely neutral enhancements 
that bring about efficiency and transparency, then we miss the socio-political and ethical 
aspects of what it means to be entangled in the mechanisms of the smart city, which are 
controlled largely by algorithmic and technological decisions. Contrary to the non-ideol-
ogy ideology of the smart city, we agree with scholars who have maintained that the smart 
city demands social theory interpretations (see Kitchin and Dodge 2011; Sadowski and 
Bendor 2018; Sadowski and Pasquale 2015; Schuilenburg and Peeters 2018; Vanolo 2014), 
and we argue, in particular, that the phenomenon of the smart city demands critical atten-
tion and criminological analysis.
Our article builds on the already increasing amount of critical debates within social 
sciences that have focused on the entanglement of smart city projects, neoliberalism and 
technocratic governance, especially on the new forms of surveillance and control triggered 
by these initiatives (Graham 2012; Greenfield 2013; Halpern et al. 2013; Hollands 2008; 
Kitchin 2014, 2015; Schuilenburg and Peeters 2018; Söderström et  al. 2014; Townsend 
2013). In particular, we consider how the smart city oscillates within a social imaginary 
populated by feelings of fear and fantasy. Put simply, how can we understand the “smart-
mentality” (Vanolo 2014) of our new cityscapes from a critical criminological perspective?
In order to answer this question, we take a closer look at the ideological origins of the 
smart city, their actual practices and their imaginary content. First, we focus on a delinea-
tion of the main features and arguments used to create smart cities, making clear how cen-
tral the promise of safety and security is to their creation. Next, we look at the techniques 
that are used within smart cities in order to establish a state of permanent surveillance and 
control of the visitors of public spaces. We reflect on the way these techniques are used 
to classify people. In our conclusion, we criticize the fact that smart city is presented as a 
depoliticized concept, while clearly being used to support specific policies that have a large 
impact on our urban coexistence.
1 https ://www.eurac tiv.com/secti on/digit al/infog raphi c/how-many-smart -citie s-are-there -in-europ e/.
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Promises of a Smart City
What, in fact, is the smart city? When is a particular city considered a “smart” one and 
what elements make up the smart city? What underlying ideological assumptions are made 
by invoking the concept “smart” and what promises are made? Despite the fact that aca-
demic attention to smart cities and their governance is growing rapidly, the term, “smart 
city,” remains a fuzzy concept that is not used consistently within the literature. The exist-
ing smart cities also seem to be as varied as the nations in which they exist. But despite this 
large variety, we can identify some core features. One of the central elements of the smart 
city is the use of advanced technology—information and communication technology, big 
data, radio frequency identification (“rfid”) tags, smart sensors, video surveillance—that 
is implemented or promoted for use against all kinds of natural and societal catastrophes 
(Sadowski and Bendor 2018). These catastrophes can come in many forms. In relation to 
the smart city, the key arguments behind the usage of these advanced technologies can be 
classified into roughly four types of disasters or challenges.
The first argument is that “smart” provides solutions for all our current and future urban 
challenges. The smart city, to paraphrase Barber (2013), fits in a discourse which suggests 
that currently, it is cities, and no longer the nation states, that are becoming the playground 
for politics. Nowadays, cities and towns are accommodating more than half of the world’s 
population, thereby creating tremendous pressure on every aspect of urban living. On 23 May 
2007, for the first time in history, there were more city dwellers than rural residents. Even 
before then—and ever since—rapid urbanization has posed major challenges with respect to 
environment, including diminished air quality, economic instability, energy and food insecu-
rity, groundwater depletion and overtaxed sewage systems, which can release effluent into a 
region’s waterways, contributing to water pollution. Accordingly, cities have been gradually 
imagined and reclassified as crucial “engines of development” and as actors “responsible” for 
their own development (Raco and Imrie 2000; Rose 1999), which is to be achieved through 
“regeneration” and “entrepreneurial” actions aimed at creating attractive urban landscapes for 
the circuits of capital (Hall and Hubbard 1998; Harvey 1989; Katz and Bradley 2013).
The second argument is that “smart” enhances democratic processes. This is the same 
assertion that is made with the introduction of each new mass medium—newspaper, radio, 
television, Internet and social media technologies and websites. In this discourse, “e-par-
ticipation” or “e-democracy” is considered to be an essential element for the functioning 
of a good smart city. In Vienna, Austria, almost 600 official assistance pages facilitate 
or replace the physical municipal authority. Surveys among the users show: “Who ‘goes 
online,’ saves about 2 h. Very smart!”2 The democratic argument is rooted in the idea that 
new technologies have the potential to leverage newer and richer forms of democratic well-
being. These technologies are presented as being citizen-based and as having the incredible 
potential to provide information to citizens in an interactive manner so that they can co-
create and participate in all sorts of planning and decision-making (Kumar 2017). Smart 
technologies, from this perspective, are presented as having great prospects for city govern-
ance, but also for democratic processes, promising to support and enable the engagement 
of citizens in important democratic activities and local decision-making.
The third argument is unsurprisingly an economic one: Smart cities foster education, 
growth, knowledge, prosperity and more. According to this neoliberal argument, “smart” 
2 https ://smart city.wien.gv.at/site/en/e-gover nment -2/.
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adds significant value and capital in cities and improves the lives of the citizens and busi-
nesses that inhabit it. The smart city is driven by innovation and entrepreneurship with the 
goal of attracting business and jobs, while focusing on efficiency, productivity and savings 
(Caragliu et  al. 2009). In the SmartSantander project in Santander, Spain, residents can 
turn their smartphones into the 20,000 sensors the city has installed. By downloading the 
“Pulse of the City” app, city officials analyze the data in real time to adjust energy use, the 
number of trash pickups needed in a given week, and even how much water to sprinkle on 
the lawns of city parks.3 Smart cities find and use technology to improve the lives of those 
who reside in them; in so doing, smart cities “force economic growth” and “force societal 
progress,” as Ginni Rometty, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of IBM, 
proclaimed in a speech on how organizations and people can become more competitive in 
the “era of smart” (Rometty 2013).
The fourth argument, and the one that interests us the most, is that smart cities pave 
the way for a safe and secure future (Lacinák and Ristvej 2017). When a city is consider-
ing investment in smart technologies, public safety and security are often key drivers for 
implementing a given initiative. The possibility of permanent surveillance of citizens by 
using smart technology that gathers and integrates large amounts of data helps ensure bet-
ter protection against the dangers of criminality and disorder. Smart cities, such as Bos-
ton and Brussels, claim that smart technologies streamline law enforcement operations in 
numerous ways, from tracking, searching and detecting suspects to proactive crime pre-
vention by identifying crime hot spots.4 The smart city, in other words, promises to be a 
safe city, and a safe city is a city worth investing in. In what follows, we turn our attention 
precisely to this promise of the smart city as a safe city, and to the ways this promise has 
been actualized.
Perfect and Permanent Surveillance
In the literature on the smart city, many scholars have voiced the need for caution about 
the promises of the smart city and the neoliberal political economy that prioritizes mar-
ket-led and technological solutions to city governance (e.g., Hollands 2008; Kitchin 2014; 
Morozov and Bria 2018). Less attention, however, has been paid to the “smart” promise of 
safety and security. How do smart cities claim to create a prosperous and risk-free environ-
ment without the danger of crime or disorder? In thinking about this question, it is impor-
tant to identify and understand the way in which the safety and security management in 
smart cities differs from the more traditional ways we have looked at security and safety. 
With this focus in mind—and drawing on several practices to make cities smart—we have 
discerned at least three different types of surveillance and control in smart cities.
Traditional Techniques of Surveillance and Control
Some of the misunderstandings about the smart city result from the name it has been given. 
Although the notion of smart city suggests that only smart technology is used to trans-
form and improve life within a city, this provides a limited perspective on what the smart 
3 https ://www2.deloi tte.com/insig hts/us/en/focus /smart -city/overv iew.html.
4 https ://www.brief cam.com/solut ions/smart -citie s.
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architecture of smart cities currently entails. Given the promises and hopeful visions sur-
rounding smart cities, it can be easy to lose sight of the fact that many of these cities still 
use traditional tools and techniques to improve public safety in public space. The move 
toward security-obsessed “smart urbanism” is rooted in retread criminological notions of 
situational crime prevention (Clarke 1980; Clarke and Mayhew 1980) and defensible space 
(Newman 1972).
Situational crime prevention and defensible space are rooted in social and cultural 
processes that date back to the eighteenth century and socio-legal discourses of domes-
tic defense (Atkinson and Blandy 2007). As crime and recidivism rates continued to rise 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, these defensive features expanded beyond the domestic 
sphere and embedded themselves in the spatial environment, subsequently reproducing 
themselves in the concept of smart city governance. Although it has been argued that policy 
initiatives, such as situational crime prevention and defensible space, have been successful 
in reducing certain forms of crime, such as burglary, shoplifting and vehicle theft, crit-
ics have pointed out that they also lead to creating sterile and homogenized environments, 
which are governed in such a way that they “design out” unwanted people or unacceptable 
activities by closing off or restricting access to spaces (e.g., Hayward 2004; Raymen 2016). 
The most taken-for-granted forms of this type of politics of cleanliness by physical means, 
which are under the supervision of varying security assemblages of public and private par-
ties and related professionals, are roadblocks to reduce people’s use of public space, barrel-
shaped benches designed explicitly to prevent certain groups to use them as a bed for the 
night, and increasingly popular banning orders to combat troublesome behavior, such as 
drunkenness, harassment, loitering, panhandling, theft, vandalism and violence (Beckett 
and Herbert 2009; Palmer and Warren 2014; Schuilenburg 2015a; Snyder 2017).
Predictive Techniques of Surveillance and Control
A second set of tools for surveillance and control used by smart cities are techniques that 
identify likely targets for physical intervention and prevent or address crime by making 
statistical predictions, such as advanced video monitoring, automated license plate recogni-
tion systems, facial recognition systems and predictive policing. Data analytics has become 
an essential part of how smart cities operate, from improving traffic flow to the anticipation 
of where and when crimes are most likely to occur across the smart city (Diachuk 2018). 
The gradual displacement and supplementation of policing personnel by these techniques 
is, in part, a consequence of increased technological opportunities and of efforts to predict 
and preempt risks, as well as to broaden the concern beyond crime control to a wider secu-
rity context in all kinds of urban environments (Schuilenburg 2015b). Such technology has 
been implemented in a number of smart cities. Aside from availability, advocates of the 
use of predictive technology in the governance of smart cities argue that it can be a valu-
able tool to combat several bureaucratic pathologies. In Atlanta, GA, and Chicago, IL, for 
example, IBM uses intelligent surveillance technologies to provide judicial authorities with 
accurate information allowing them to detect crime patterns based on big data analytics. 
According to IBM, they are helping the police to work better because “law enforcement’s 
main problem is the fragmentation of information” (Willis and Aurigi 2017: 156). Here, 
for the purposes of prevention, the behavior of individuals and specific groups is monitored 
and anticipated, and, where necessary, subjected to interventions.
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Psychopolitical Techniques of Surveillance and Control
A third set of tools for surveillance and control is what we term “psychopolitical tech-
niques.” These are persuasive techniques to profile and actively modify the behavior of 
the visitors to public space in smart cities. In line with the former set of techniques, these 
techniques use big data to make predictions relating to the safety and security of public 
space in smart cities. In sharp contrast to predictive techniques, however, these tools try 
to influence the behavior of visitors in public space. From a theoretical perspective, these 
psychopolitical techniques can be labeled as “nudging.” The concept of nudging has gained 
widespread recognition through the work of Thaler and Sunstein, who claimed in their 
book, Nudge (2009), that nudging can be understood as the attempt to alter people’s behav-
ior in a predictable way (“paternalistic aspect”) without forbidding any options or changing 
significantly their incentives (“libertarian aspect”). The concept of nudge captures many 
of the mechanisms at play in the type of psychopolitical techniques that we associate with 
smart cities.
More specifically, smart cities increasingly use psychopolitical techniques, such as light 
and sound manipulation, to manage public space and to evoke affective responses from 
visitors. In the Dutch city of Eindhoven, for example, a consortium of parties, including the 
tech company, Philips, the Intelligent Lighting Institute, the Dutch Institute for Technology, 
Safety & Security, and the Institute of Mental Health Care, makes use of light manipulation 
in the entertainment area Stratumseind—one of the busiest streets for nightlife in the Neth-
erlands with more than 50 cafes, bars and nightclubs. By changing color and light intensity, 
the aim is to reduce tension and aggression and to establish, what the consortium terms, 
“a happy city.”5 The color blue is said to have a cooling effect. When the right shade of 
blue is used, it can lower heart rates and reduce people’s aggression. As a result, “proper” 
behavior in this entertainment area is encouraged, while unwanted behavior—aggression, 
excessive noise, public drunkenness, vandalism and violence—is discouraged by the use of 
these techniques (Schuilenburg and Peeters 2018).
While the use of psychopolitical techniques, such as light and sound in public space, is 
not a new phenomenon, more than ever before, larger amounts of data can now be analyzed 
and shared easily among different parties. This accelerates and expands the potential of 
psychopolitical techniques to modify people’s behavior in public space. In order to improve 
the safety of the area and the well-being of the individual visitor, the smart city of Eind-
hoven keeps track of: the amount and nature of social interactions, police presence, waste 
in the street, and the presence and behavior of bouncers at cafes. The city also monitors and 
records beer consumption, mobile phone data (including presence of phones and move-
ment patterns), parking density, people entering and exiting Stratumseind, social media 
posts, the sound level, and weather information all in an effort to forecast early signs of 
violence.6
In order to better understand how the three different types of surveillance and control—
that we described above and that coexist in smart cities—function as a means to influence 
behavior, we now turn to the way the smart city is structured as a social imaginary. Doing 
so reveals how the ascribed techniques of surveillance and control serve as a generator of 
feelings of fear and fantasy.
5 https ://synch ronic ity-iot.eu/how-smart -eindh oven-is/.
6 https ://gr1p.org/tag/strat umsei nd/.
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The Social Imaginary of the Smart City
The smart city is an imaginary city. Several theories of the social imaginary have tried to 
explain the way imagination figures in the construction of central social institutions, rep-
resentations and practices. According to Taylor (2004), the social imaginary refers to the 
ways in which people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how 
things transpire between them and their fellow citizens, their expectations, and the norma-
tive notions and images which underlie these expectations. In other words, the social imag-
inary is that common understanding which makes possible common practices, and a widely 
shared sense of legitimacy. As such, Taylor (2004: 92) speaks of imaginary to emphasize 
all that is carried in images, legends, stories, and so on, and which is a largely unstructured 
and inarticulate understanding of our whole situation, which can never be expressed ade-
quately in the form of explicit doctrines. He speaks of social imaginary to emphasize the 
type of imaginary that is shared by large groups of people, if not the whole society.
The smart city, which represents perhaps the last phase in the “history of urban imagi-
naries” (Vanolo 2014; 885), is assembled and held together by different social imaginar-
ies, which are created and maintained through the production, circulation and reception 
of images and symbols, fictions and representations. These imaginaries are performative 
in the sense that they produce the reality they aim to represent. For instance, the notion of 
smart city is presented in mainstream discourses as a solution to all kind of catastrophic 
events that cities face now and will face in the future, ranging from high rates of crime to 
democratic failures. In line with that promise, the smart city is presented as the most desir-
able model for the development of the cities of tomorrow, where the application of smart 
solutions will resolve all sort of regulatory, safety and social issues. As a consequence, the 
smart city will be a place where we will eliminate most of our current urban risks—from 
pollution to unemployment, from crime to traffic—due to new technologies, such as pre-
dictive policing, psychopolitical techniques (including light, smell and sound manipula-
tion), rfid-tags, smart sensors and WiFi trackers.
Here, it is important to realize that the idea of risk, itself, is a highly imaginary and per-
formative concept that creates its own reality. Being inherently an imaginative and future-
oriented concept, risk has enabled actuarial, preemptive and preventative forms of govern-
ance in multiple fields which try to “stabilize how particular futures play out” (Kinsley 
2012: 1557). Risk and imagination have in common the fact that they bring into exist-
ence what is not there—and risk assumes a projective faculty to predict future events—
to imagine what could or might happen. This means that our understandings about risks 
are informed ultimately by culturally and socially structured conceptions and evaluations 
about the world (what it looks like, what it should or should not be) and conjure up those 
visions through the power of the social imaginary. We create categories of “risky behav-
iors,” “risky persons,” or “risky groups,” with the main purposes of safeguarding ourselves 
and our societies from them. In doing that, we inevitably fantasize, imagine and project. 
Sorting behaviors, persons and groups according to risk is achieved “by bringing possible 
future undesired events into calculations done in the present, making their avoidance the 
object of decision-making processes, and administering individuals, institutions, expertise 
and resources in the service of that ambition” (Rose 2000: 332).
As we have seen, the governance of smart cities and the application of smart technology 
to foster economic growth and improve the well-being of its citizens has often been consid-
ered a neutral activity. But as we have argued, although it is presented in apparently neutral 
terms with purported and professed concern for or interest in customers, effectiveness and 
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efficiency, smart cities are, in fact, anything but neutral, and their governance and use of 
technology have important political and social implications. Smart technology is inherently 
a form of power that defines “the normal” and identifies “the deviant.” In other words, 
“smart technology can take away from our experience of living as much as it can add to it” 
(Stimmel 2016: 19). To gain a better understanding of this political and social process, we 
return to the effects of the aforementioned three types of surveillance and control in smart 
cities.
Making Up People, Sorting Out People
Foucauldian genealogy has shown how the processes by which subjects are constituted 
always take place within specific discourse formations, regimes of truth and power–knowl-
edge relations. Nevertheless, studies of the social construction of subjects by smart tech-
nologies are relatively underdeveloped in the social sciences, with notable exceptions, such 
as Hacking’s (1990) argument about statistics “making people up” or Bowker and Star’s 
(2000) exploration of the role of standards and classification in ordering human interac-
tion—particularly the invisible ways in which this is normalized and made “natural.” Rou-
vroy and Berns (2013: 7), for example, has explored how the subjects and the physical 
world are taken as “objects of observation, classification and evaluation” by automated 
systems which end up steering and “structuring of the field of possibilities of action of 
others.” Likewise, Osborne and Rose (1999) have mapped several ways in which the city 
becomes a core element of the governance of human conduct, subjectivity and life.
Societies have always designed social categories through processes of social mark-
ing and marginalization (Brekhus 1996) to legitimize the exclusion of persons or groups 
deemed as deviant or problematic. This process of social marking or “social sorting,” as 
Lyon (2003) has called it, creates multilayer scales of people and a hierarchy of differ-
ences, whereby a vast apparatus of experts, institutions and procedures start to play key 
roles in creating, shaping and entrenching social categories (Conrad and Schneider 1980; 
Garland 1985). In fact, the etymology of the word “sorting” derives from the Latin (sors, 
sortis), which means lot, fate or destiny. Social sorting thus fulfills then the prophecy of 
deciding the fate of others. Nowadays, social sorting is a core mechanism of governmental-
ity (conceived as “conduct of conduct”), which involves the way in which subjects form 
their identities through processes of government—processes that encourage and suppress 
actions by drawing a line between what is acceptable and what is unacceptable, between 
what is strange and suspicious and what is not.
Vanolo (2016) has identified four distinct imaginaries of smart cities which relate dif-
ferently to people: (1) an imaginary of a city with high-tech materialities but without any 
human presence; (2) a dystopian city characterized by surveillance and totalitarianism; (3) 
the resubjectification of citizens as active smart citizens; and the (4) the ideological con-
struction of the “citizen of the future.” These imaginaries can be overlapping and coex-
isting. In relation to our analysis that attempts to understand better the aim of smart cit-
ies toward establishing a perfect and permanent surveillance of citizens, we can discern at 
least three modes of creating and constituting subjectivities along a continuum of inclu-
sion/exclusion in which people are (a) “designed out,” whereby spaces are purified; (b) 
“sorted out,” whereby spaces are filtered; or (c) “designed in,” whereby spaces are modu-
lated. We examine these in turn.
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Purification Through “Designing Out”
First, there is a growing tendency in the smart city to remove everything that is not “clean” 
from commercial zones, such as entertainment areas and shopping centers. This means that 
what is called “a matter out of place” must be removed from public space. The expression 
“a matter out of place” comes from Mary Douglas’ Purity and Danger (1966). In explain-
ing the term “dirt,” Douglas pointed out two conditions that are implied in the definition 
of dirt as a matter out of place: “a set of ordered relations and contravention of that order” 
(1966: 44), which means that the determination of something as “out of place” is a relative 
idea and depends on the relationship between that object and its context. Since Douglas’s 
discussion of “dirt” and “out of place,” further attempts have been made to expand these 
terms and relate them to various contexts, including the question whether something or 
someone is “in place” or “out of place” in urban environments (e.g., Cresswell 1996; Schu-
ilenburg 2018; Wright 1997).
Today, there are whole industries focusing solely on creating products that keep out 
unwanted behavior, people and groups. In the context of the smart city, the purification 
of public space takes place through “designing out” of persons or groups by making use 
of traditional tools of surveillance and security such as “sadistic street furniture” (Davis 
1992) and banning orders. In their book Banished (2009), Beckett and Herbert chart the 
development of such powers in US cities, which range from “stay out of park orders,” “stay 
out of area orders,” and “trespass orders.” Similarly, in the UK, the Antisocial Behaviour, 
Crime and Policing Act of 2014 has expanded powers for state authorities to control who 
can do what in public space through “injunctions for the prevention of nuisance and annoy-
ance,” “public space protection orders” and “dispersal orders,” which can be applied in any 
place if the police “suspect” a person’s behavior. In the Netherlands, smart cities, such as 
Eindhoven and Utrecht, use banning orders, such as the Collective Pub Ban and the Col-
lective Shop Ban, to combat crime and disorder in the inner city (Schuilenburg 2015a). 
In these cities, purification starts with the removal of beggars, homeless people, loitering 
youth, the mentally ill, messy or slovenly individuals, those who seem technologically illit-
erate or unlikely to buy anything, and basically anyone who seems “out of place.” They 
become “social dirt” because they perturb the normalization of smart space and what the 
local authorities and public–private assemblages think “clean” and “harmless” means in 
the smart city. More importantly, these persons are considered deviant or dangerous not 
for what they have done, but because of who they are, the traits they possess—or worse—
for what they might do (or “not do” if we think along with the concept of “actively smart 
citizen”).
Social Sorting Through “Filtering”
The smart city makes use of predictive techniques which identify likely targets for physi-
cal intervention, and prevent or address crime by making statistical predictions with the 
help of tools, such as advanced video monitoring, automated license plate recognition 
systems, facial recognition systems and predictive policing. For the purposes of preven-
tion, the behavior of individuals and specific groups is monitored and predicted, and, 
where necessary, subjected to interventions. The use of predictive technologies, then, 
becomes both the cause and effect of processes of “social sorting” (Lyon 2003), which 
comprise categorization and classification, division and subdivision, and differentiation 
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and hierarchization—all mechanisms that are decisive in sorting populations according to 
perceived risk or value for the purpose of assessment and judgment (Monahan 2011).
Smart technology with the goal of monitoring and predicting likely targets has been 
implemented in a number of smart cities, including Amsterdam, Santa Cruz, CA, and 
Stockholm. Such programs are generally not expensive, due to the fact that city police 
departments usually have most of the tools needed already in place. According to the tech 
company, IBM, one of the first companies to employ the software for law enforcement, 
predictive policing is helping mayors and police departments to tackle crime on a reduced 
budget. It is a cost-effective way to “do more with less.” In Atlanta, GA, and Chicago, IL, 
for example, IBM uses intelligent surveillance technologies to provide judicial authorities 
with accurate information allowing them to detect crime patterns based on big data analyt-
ics. According to IBM, they are helping the police to work better because “law enforce-
ment’s main problem is the fragmentation of information” (Willis and Aurigi 2017: 156).
The wider consequences of such developments have been a key concern for scholars, 
with a particular focus on human rights, justice and privacy (Kemshall 2008; Zedner 
2009), and the issues of discrimination and marginalization of certain groups (Harcourt 
2007; Monahan 2017; van Eijk 2016). These critics have pointed out that smart techniques, 
such as predictive policing, establish a cycle of self-fulfilling prophecies because they are 
based on historical data and produce discriminatory results due to the fact that crime data 
reflect longstanding institutional biases along income and racial lines (Smith et al. 2017; 
Peeters and Schuilenburg 2018).
Modulation Through “Designing In”
The third mode of creating and constituting subjectivities involves the modulation of pub-
lic space in the smart city and the smart citizen, who is included in it or “designed in.” An 
important objective is to make public space a pleasant place to be for everyone—provided 
that those individuals engage in a certain set of behaviors in a specific way. As we have 
seen, psychopolitical techniques are used to stimulate an efficient, safe and consumption-
focused use of space by modulating the mood and behavior of the users of that space. Here, 
neoliberal logic mingles with the logic of perfect and permanent surveillance—because 
what appears important in smart cities is “to control and to facilitate the freedom of move-
ment and circulation of people from place to place, in such a way that the inherent dangers 
of this circulation are canceled out” (Foucault 2009: 65). In other words, the smart city 
seeks control without stopping or hampering the flow of visitors in public space.
In Stratumseind in the center of Eindhoven, predictive surveillance (e.g., cameras, 
microphones, WiFi trackers) has been combined with psychopolitical techniques (e.g., 
color and light intensity) to improve the safety of this smart street and the wellness of the 
visitors, while such visitors remain absolutely unaware of their use. In order to de-escalate 
potential violent conflicts between visitors in the public space, the intensity and color of 
light is changed when the density in the area increases and the smell of oranges is diffused 
to calm visitors (Naafs 2018). Remarkably, these techniques stand in sharp contrast to the 
ascribed traditional techniques of surveillance and control, which seek to “design out” 
unwanted behavior without providing cues for alternative behavior. Instead of forbidding 
and punishing, these techniques work through pleasing and seducing, creating interven-
tions in the environment that subsequently condition people’s behaviors. Here, visitors are 
seduced by soft techniques and not by “strong signs or powers” (Baudrillard 1979: 83) in 
order to “keep” them safe and to deal proactively with potential aggressive behavior.
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Conclusion and Reflection
The term smart city—usually understood as a city that uses technology to improve services 
and become more efficient—is becoming pervasive in the urban discourse of the twenty-
first century. When we contemplate smart cities, we usually think of Asian cities as Seoul, 
Singapore and Songdo, but the reality of the smart city is that it has stretched into the eve-
ryday fabric of urban life in urban areas all over the world, from Greece to India.
Given the fact that there are a growing number of smart cities that have started to exper-
iment with a technology-based securitization of public space, we have discerned three 
types of techniques embedded in the promise of smartness which operate on a continuum 
of inclusion/exclusion. When smartness is projected onto the city, a wide array of security 
techniques is used to make the city a safer and more secure place, consisting of (1) tradi-
tional techniques that are used to “design out” people; (2) predictive techniques that are 
used to “filter” people; and (3) psychopolitical techniques that are used to “keep” people in 
commercial and entertainment zones. As this development is quickly becoming a pervasive 
international phenomenon, it is important to understand how the smart city is triggering 
policies that produce subjects that are either differentially included or excluded—people 
who will benefit and people marginalized from the circuits of power (Hollands 2008). All 
of this is occurring under the guise of “apolitical” technological solutions. As we have 
argued in this article, although the smart city is presented as a depoliticized concept, it is 
clearly an example of a “political assemblage” (McFarlane 2011). As such, the smart city 
not only reproduces the social order, but also produces new social categories through new 
forms of smart governance.
Although it is sometimes difficult to see the added value of the “smart” label, our 
analysis demonstrates that the social imaginary of the smart city oscillates within a cata-
strophic narrative populated by feelings of fear and fantasy. This means that the narrative 
begins with all kind of catastrophes—air pollution, crime, disorder, economic instability, 
food insecurity and traffic—which can be solved only by the promise of smart technology. 
If, however, we gaze beneath the clichés and rhetoric, the smart city appears as a “naked 
king”—a commercial construct designed to sell a corporate vision of capital accumula-
tion, which necessitates different types of surveillance to achieve it. As a consequence, the 
social body is modified, purified, sorted and thus governed according to what works best in 
order “to de-risk investment in smart cities and communities.”7
The “smartmentality” or the governance of the smart city is intrinsically related to sur-
veillance and social control. As we have argued in this article, as the smart city continues 
to become a global phenomenon, it also transforms old forms and techniques of social con-
trol and creates a new discourse imbued with new instruments (e.g., “psychopolitical tech-
niques”) and a new array of concepts (e.g., “happy city”). Accordingly, it is important for 
criminologists to engage critically with the phenomenon of the smart city, its imaginaries, 
promises and realities, in order to demystify precisely the supposedly lack of “ideology” in 
these projects and to understand how such projects are contributing toward new forms of 
social exclusion and inclusion.
7 This must be the main goal of the EU policies regarding smart cities, according to Martin Brynskov, 
Chair of Open & Agile Smart Cities and Coordinator of SynchroniCity, the European IoT Large-Scale Pilot 
for Smart Cities and Communities (https ://synch ronic ity-iot.eu/towar ds-de-riski ng-inves tment s-in-smart 
-citie s-commu nitie s/.
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